Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic
Science
Volume 3 Themis: Research Journal of Justice
Studies and Forensic Science, Spring 2015

Article 11

5-2015

Time, Ethics and Experience: Review of David O. Brink's Prospects
for Temporal Neutrality
Pedja Ilic
San Jose State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Ilic, Pedja (2015) "Time, Ethics and Experience: Review of David O. Brink's Prospects for Temporal
Neutrality," Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science: Vol. 3 , Article 11.
https://doi.org/10.31979/THEMIS.2015.0311 https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol3/iss1/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Justice Studies at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science by an authorized
editor of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.

Time, Ethics and Experience: Review of David O. Brink's Prospects for Temporal
Neutrality
Abstract
Are temporal locations of harms and benefits important to human existence? Conventional wisdom
unambiguously suggests so, albeit interpretations of various dogmatic texts and beliefs. Discussions
about pain, grief, and suffering are commonly favored within past temporal settings, unlike those of
happiness, comfort, and wellbeing that permeate conversations with future temporal locales. Past pain is
preferred to future pain, even when this choice includes more total pain (Callender, 2011). Should these
positive and negative qualifiers that constitute conscious existence have privileged temporal locations?
This ethical question, like many others surrounding temporality, inherits both theoretical and pragmatic
inquiries - becoming indispensable within moral and juridical dispositions. The concept of temporal
neutrality, which posits that agents should not attach normative significance to temporal locations of
benefits and harms, all else being equal, is central to the present philosophical investigation.
In his Prospects for Moral Neutrality chapter of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time (2011),
David O. Brink articulates what exactly temporal neutrality requires and why we ought to care about its
precepts. As they are assessed by how they distribute benefits and harms across people’s lives through
interpersonal distributive justice, actions and policies can also be assessed by their distribution of
benefits and harms across time. This concept of intertemporal distribution is a normative demand of
temporal neutrality, and according to some philosophers it makes temporal neutrality an essential part of
rationality (Brink, 2011). However, establishing an impartial foundation for temporal neutrality often
appears controversial and counterintuitive.

Keywords
temporal neutrality, ethics

This book review is available in Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science:
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol3/iss1/11

Ilic: Time, Ethics and Experience

205

Time, Ethics, and Experience: Review of David O.
Brink’s  Prospects for Temporal Neutrality
Pedja Ilic

Introduction
Are temporal locations of harms and benefits important
to human existence? Conventional wisdom unambiguously
suggests so, albeit interpretations of various dogmatic texts and
beliefs. Discussions about pain, grief, and suffering are
commonly favored within past temporal settings, unlike those of
happiness, comfort, and wellbeing that permeate conversations
with future temporal locales. Past pain is preferred to future pain,
even when this choice includes more total pain (Callender,
2011). Should these positive and negative qualifiers that
constitute conscious existence have privileged temporal
locations? This ethical question, like many others surrounding
temporality, inherits both theoretical and pragmatic inquiries becoming indispensable within moral and juridical dispositions.
The concept of temporal neutrality, which posits that agents
should not attach normative significance to temporal locations of
benefits and harms, all else being equal, is central to the present
philosophical investigation.
In his Prospects for Moral Neutrality chapter of The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time (2011), David O. Brink
articulates what exactly temporal neutrality requires and why we
ought to care about its precepts. As they are assessed by how
they  distribute  benefits  and  harms  across  people’s  lives  through  
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interpersonal distributive justice, actions and policies can also be
assessed by their distribution of benefits and harms across time.
This concept of intertemporal distribution is a normative demand
of temporal neutrality, and according to some philosophers it
makes temporal neutrality an essential part of rationality (Brink,
2011). However, establishing an impartial foundation for
temporal neutrality often appears controversial and
counterintuitive.
Prudence and Temporal Neutrality
Temporal neutrality is reflected in the demands of
prudence: the ability to govern and discipline oneself by the use
of reason (Meriam-Webster, 2014). Prudence requires agents to
promote  their  own  “good”  throughout  their  lives.  But  the  “good”  
can, and arguably should, be promoted to all parts of the lives of
others too. Brink (2011) implies that, while prudence requires
temporal neutrality, temporal neutrality is not limited to
prudence. Reflecting on Scottish moral philosopher Adam
Smith’s   claims   surrounding   temporal   neutrality,   as  explained   in  
his seminal work The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), Brink
(2011) affirms that temporal neutrality does not need to be
confined to prudential concern   with   one’s   own   wellbeing,   but  
can extend to concern for the wellbeing of others. Temporal bias
spurred   by   an   agent’s   disproportional   ascription   of   normative  
significance to the short-term, while discounting long-term
harms and benefits, is often thought to be the reason for various
moral failings (Brink, 2011).
Following in the steps of Adam Smith, British utilitarian
philosopher and economist, Henry Sidgwick, in his The Methods
of Ethics (1907), further qualifies normative aspects of temporal
neutrality  as  a  response  to  British  philosopher  Jeremy  Bentham’s  
normative inclination to temporal proximities of pleasures and
THEMIS
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol3/iss1/11
DOI: 10.31979/THEMIS.2015.0311

2

Ilic: Time, Ethics and Experience

207
pain,   calling   it   “the most prominent element in the notion of
rational”   (Brink,   2011,   p.   355).   Sidgwick   elaborates   on the
aspects of temporal neutrality and prudence, first by recognizing
that   prudence’s   temporal   neutrality   is   constrained   about   the  
distribution of harms and benefits over time within a single life,
and is impartial about the content of the good. And since there
are different conceptions of the good as in preferencesatisfaction   terms,   like   Sidgwick’s   hedonism,   he   concludes   that  
what  is  indeed  good  is  conditioned  upon  an  agent’s  character  and  
psychological states (Brink, 2011). Sidgwick also acknowledges
that temporal neutrality is not limited to neither his hedonistic
prudence, nor prudence in the commonly understood sense.
Since prudence is intrinsically concerned with the magnitude of
benefits, but not their temporal location, temporal location can
inherit significance when correlated with factors affecting the
magnitude of harms and benefits. In this sense, temporal
neutrality seems to justify temporal bias, precisely because the
same resources yield goods of different magnitudes for both
present and future (Brink, 2011).
Sidgwick further explicates this point by drawing
distinctions between objective and subjective reasons and
rationality. Assertions of objective rationality stipulate what an
agent has reason to do under the circumstances, whether or not
an agent is aware of these facts or in a position to recognize the
reasons they support. Conversely, assertions of subjective
rationality stipulate what an agent has reason to do, given their
beliefs under the circumstances. It is this dichotomy that gives
rise to possible situations where objectively rational actions can
be subjectively irrational and vice versa. This situation compels
us to think of prudence purely in terms of an objective reason.
Objective reasons are central to the retrospective evaluations of
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one’s   conduct,   and   subsequent   adjustment   to   one’s  
conceptualization and behavior stemming from prior successes
and failures. Objective reasons have what Brink (2011) calls
“explanatory   and   theoretical   primacy”   in   discussions   about  
practical reason (p. 357).
Prudence defined along these lines consents dissimilar
treatment  of  different  temporal  locations  in  an  agent’s  life.  Brink  
(2011), alongside David J. Velleman, argues that it is possible to
hold a version of this view that treats lives within certain
narrative structures as more valuable, all else being equal, than
other lives; this might be particularly true of lives whose upward
trajectory is defined by preceding harms endured to facilitate
future benefits, over those lives in which benefits came first, all
else being equal. This seemingly unequal treatment of temporal
locations is justified by an equal concern for   all   parts   of   one’s  
life and is, in fact, required by temporal neutrality if, and only if,
temporal distribution of harms and benefits within a life actually
contributes to the total value of that life; temporal locations hold
no independent significance. Brink (2011) simplifies this concept
as now-for-later sacrifice. He further argues that intrapersonal
conflicts of value, in which what one does affects both the
magnitude   of   benefits   and   harms   in   one’s   life,   as   well   as   their  
temporal ordering, are expected and do not compromise the
concept of temporal neutrality.
While Sidgwick supports this notion of temporal
neutrality as a central aspect of our concept of rationality, Brink
(2011) contends that Sidgwick does so out of his sympathy for
hedonism; if all this principle does is limit its application to
intrapersonal conflicts where temporal location is the only
variable,  the  principle  is  overly  restrictive.  Sidgwick’s  hedonism,  
as a monistic theory of good, permits us to make assumptions
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and restrict the application of temporal neutrality only to
homogenous goods. Brink (2011) disagrees with this line of
reasoning, and suggests that this problem is best avoided if we
allow temporal neutrality to apply to conflicts with multiple
variables, insisting only that it prohibits assigning value to
temporal location insofar as this affects the value of the whole.
This would open up avenues for the application of temporal
neutrality to heterogeneous conflicts recognizable by the
pluralistic theories of good (Brink, 2011).
Compensation and the Rationale for Temporal Neutrality
Brink (2011) asks, is there a rationale for temporal
neutrality? This question becomes important considering that
temporal neutrality requires sacrifice that can be justified by the
demand. Now-for-later sacrifice is a perfect example that
provides us with an answer: compensation. Since prudence is
temporally neutral, utilitarianism as a theory of normative ethics,
which holds that actions are right if they are useful or for the
benefit of a majority, is person-neutral. Since temporal neutrality
requires intrapersonal balancing, person-neutrality requires
interpersonal balancing; benefits to some ought to be balanced
against harms to others, if needed, in order to produce optimal
interpersonal outcome overall (Brink, 2011).
American philosopher John Rawls in his A Theory of
Justice (1971)   accepts   prudence’s   intrapersonal   balancing,   but  
points  out  how  utilitarianism’s  interpersonal  balancing  is  highly  
problematic,  for  it  “…conflates  all  persons  into  one…  and  does  
not  take  distinction  between  persons  seriously”  (Rawls, 1971, p.
27-28). In other words, balancing of benefits and harms is
acceptable within a life, but not across lives. Brink (2011)
explains this point as follows: in the intrapersonal case,
benefactor and beneficiary are the same person and
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compensation happens automatically; in the interpersonal case,
benefactor and beneficiary are different people and unless the
beneficiary  somehow  reciprocates,  the  benefactor’s  sacrifice  will  
not be compensated. The critics of utilitarianism find this
approach unacceptable; there ought to be independent principles
of interpersonal distribution for each agent individually.
Rationalizing the Hybrid Structure of Prudence
The hybrid structure of prudence comes from being both
temporally neutral and agent relative, and as such can be
contrasted against two non-hybrid theories; neutralism, which
holds that an agent has reason to do something just insofar as it
is valuable, regardless of temporal locations and who the
beneficiaries are; and presentism, a completely relative
normative   theory   regarding   an   agent’s   reasons   for   action   being  
grounded in his or her present interests. Since time and person
are parallel distributional dimensions, it must be decided where
to locate harms and benefits in time and among persons.
However, when this particular perspective is adopted, prudence
becomes somewhat of an unstable hybrid since it stipulates to
whom a benefit or harm falls, but not when (Brink 2011, p. 361).
British philosopher Derek Parfit, in his Reason and
Persons (1984), also voices concern about the hybrid structure of
prudence, which he calls a self-interest theory (S):
As a hybrid S can be attacked from both directions. And
what S claims about one rival might be turned against it
by the other, In rejecting Neutralism, a Self Interest
Theorist must claim that a reason may have force only
for the agent. But the grounds for this claim support a
further claim. If a reason can have force only for the
agent, it can have a force for the agent only at the time of
acting. The Self-interest Theorist must reject this claim.
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He must attack the notion of a time-relative reason. But
arguments to show that reasons must be temporally
neutral, thus refuting the Present-aim theory, may also
show that reasons must be neutral between different
people, thus refuting the Self-interest Theory. (p. 140).
Sidgwick disagrees with Parfit and argues that prudence in its
hybrid character can indeed be defended as long as the
separateness of persons is  recognized,  and  Humean’s  skepticism
about personal identity over time is rejected (Brink, 2011).
However, Brink (2011) questions if the compensation principle,
as seen among intertemporal and interpersonal distribution,
provides enough rationale to defend the hybrid theory of
prudence;;   he   asks:   “could   not   doubts   about   interpersonal  
balancing be extended to intrapersonal balancing? If the
separateness of persons defeats interpersonal balancing, why
does   not   the   separateness   of   different   periods   within   a   person’s  
life defeat intrapersonal   balancing?”   (p.   364).   He   sees  
Sidgwick’s   argument   about   the   separateness   of   persons   as  
requiring temporal impartiality, in addition to temporal
neutrality. The problem of compensation turns to the subpersonal perspective, whose limit is a fully relative momentary
time slice – a single segment of the person. And, in order to
determine if compensation has occurred, the subject needs to be
clearly determined. This becomes increasingly difficult when we
talk about arbitrary person-segments;;   people’s   lives   constitute
multitudes of past, present, and future segments, not only
individual time slices, therefore, the subject cannot be an
individual person-segment, but a person as a complete entity
(Brink, 2011).
Lastly, Brink (2011) dispels the problem of
conceptualizing   a   person   as   “all   there”   in   relation   to   the  
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subject/person being a complete entity; if person-segments
extend  in  the  future,  they,  by   default,   are   not  “all  there,”   hence  
undermining the concept of an agent as a determinate subject.
The present self-acts as a representative of the temporally
dispersed entity, the subject, by acting in the interest of this
being. Therefore, the fact that the temporally extended person is
“not  all  there”  at  the  time  of  action,  is  not  a  reason  to  deny  that it
is the subject whose interests determine what agents have reason
to do. Under this hypothesis we, once again, have intrapersonal
compensation; therefore compensation does justify temporal
neutrality (Brink, 2011).
Personal Identity and Temporal Neutrality
The rationale for temporal neutrality appears to rest on
certain assumptions about personal identity. In the long tradition
of thinking about personal identity in terms of psychological
continuity and connectedness, Parfit (1984) argues that
psychological reductionism has a potential to undermine
prudence’s   demand   for   temporal   neutrality.   Psychological  
reductionism argues that two persons are psychologically
connected insofar as the intentional states and actions of one
influence the intentional states of the other; they are
psychologically continuous insofar as they represent links in the
chain or series of people in which contiguous links in the chain
are psychologically well connected. Also, continuity and
connectedness can be matters of degree (Brink 2011). Parfit
further attacks temporal neutrality with the concept of discount
rate of   connectedness,   arguing   that,   “since   connectedness   is  
nearly always weaker over long periods, I can rationally care less
about   my   further   future”   (Parfit,   1984, p. 313). This becomes
problematic since psychological reductionism does not justify
duty or permissibility to discount; if the improvement involves
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psychological change that diminishes connectedness, then there
are less prudential reasons to undertake it.
However, provided that one plays a suitable role in
generating and shaping the change in his or her beliefs, the
change in character presents no obstacle to preservation of
connectedness over time. Likewise, the argument about
transitive relations – if A=B and B=C, then A=C – qualifies
personal identity, but not the psychological connectedness. In the
case of continuity, as opposed to connectedness, if A is
connected to B, and B is connected to C, then A and C will be
continuous, even though they are not well connected. Regardless
of this situation, Brink (2011) argues that diminished
connectedness between A and C does not diminish the continuity
between A and C; if reductionism is formulated in terms of
continuity, rather than connectedness, then diminished
connectedness over time does not justify a discount rate. Even in
the case that connectedness actually matters, the reductionist
case for discounting confounds parts and wholes. As long as it is
the person who is the agent and whose interests are at stake,
differences   in   connectedness   among   the   parts   of   a   person’s   life  
should   not,   as   such,   affect   the   person’s   reasons   to   have   equal  
regard for all part of the life. Brink (2011) ultimately concludes
that such considerations undermine the reductionist case for
discount rate, leaving rationale for temporal neutrality
metaphysically robust.
Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value
By elaborating intrapersonal conflicts of value, Brink
(2011)   employs   Parfit’s   Russian Nobleman example – whether
or not one should be expected to moderate the pursuit of ideals
one holds dear in the present, for the sake of ideals one presently
rejects but will accept in the future – to reiterate and defend
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argumentation from the previous section on personal identity and
temporal   neutrality;;   provided   one’s   present   ideals   are  
worthwhile, one can honor temporal neutrality by acting in
accord   with   one’s   present   ideals   and   thereby   avoiding  
intertemporal conflict.
But what happens when one is faced with unavoidable
intertemporal conflicts? The implications of temporal neutrality
in situations involving unavoidable intrapersonal conflicts of
ideals depend on the merits of the conflicting ideals; for the
purpose of clarity, unavoidable conflicts are divided into two
categories, symmetrical and asymmetrical. The asymmetrical
conflicts are divided into cases of corruption – before’s ideals
are valuable, whereas after’s are not – and improvement –
before’s ideals are worthless, whereas after’s ideals are valuable.
In this case, the demands of temporal neutrality are clear – one
should act on the worthwhile ideals when one has them, not the
worthless  ones,  for  this  is  a  claim  about  one’s  objective  reasons.  
In the case of corruption, all one has to do is act on current ideals
(Brink, 2011). However, the case of improvement delegates
further inquiry in the light of the question: should one act on the
worthless ideals one presently embraces, irrespective of the
worthwhile ideals one will act upon in the future? In other
words, can temporal neutrality make plausible claims about
subjective rationality? Could it be subjectively rational to act on
valuable ideals that one does not presently hold? Brink (2011)
argues yes, provided that we understand subjective reasons as the
reasons one has, not in virtue of what one now judges, but in
virtue of what it would be reasonable for one to judge now if one
gave the matter due attention.
In the case of conflicts with symmetrical merits, there
are also multiple categories. There is a minus-minus situation
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where conflicting ideals are similarly worthless and a plus-plus
situation where the conflicting ideals are both equally valuable.
In the minus-minus case, neutrality argument delegates that
neither ideals be embraced, favoring an alternative third ideal
that might have merit. Conversely, in the plus-plus case,
temporal neutrality recognizes a conflict of objective reasons –
after’s ideals conflict with before’s ideals regardless of what the
agent does now – among two valuable ideals and suggests a sort
of neutrality among them. Brink (2011) proposes that in case of
such a genuine dilemma, where one has to choose temporally
among valuable ideals, neutrality accommodates two possible
scenarios; first, one might achieve less-than-substantial success
along both ideals – neither a stellar success nor an abject failure
at any time; second, one might engage in the unreserved and
successful pursuit of ideals either now, or later, however, not
both, provided that the process of selecting the favored ideal
gave equal chances of success to both ideals. Provided that
merits of the conflicting ideals are not transcendent facts, these
claims   about   the   agent’s   objective   reasons   apply   to   subjective  
reasons as well. Since neither of these options is ideal, Brink
(2011) offers prospective consolation by reasoning infrequency
of such genuine dilemmas.
The Symmetry Argument
Unlike the previous arguments about temporal
neutrality, some of the symmetry arguments brought by the
Epicureans – arguments that claim philosophy should be
confrontational and involve the removal of the fear of death,
since it tends to cause anxiety – are concentrated on the concept
of nonexistence. Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius
recognizes asymmetry in our attitudes towards past and future as
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irrational, and in his De Rerum Natura, invokes symmetry
between postmortem and prenatal nonexistence as follows:
1. Death brings nonexistence.
2. Postmortem nonexistence is no different than
prenatal nonexistence.
3. We do not regret our prenatal nonexistence.
4. Hence, we should not regret our death.
But Brink (2011) points out that appeals to symmetry are
problematic since the parity of prenatal and postmortem
nonexistence can be exploited to expand and contract regret. He
exemplifies it in the following symmetry argument:
1. Death brings nonexistence.
2. Postmortem nonexistence is no different than
prenatal nonexistence.
3. We do regret our death.
4. Hence, we should regret our prenatal nonexistence.
(p. 375).
The Epicurean symmetry argument appeals to the existence
requirement, which delegates that one cannot be harmed if one
does not exist, but it does not explain why death is not bad. One
can indeed be harmed by death, since death deprives one of the
goods one would have enjoyed had one continued to exist; if this
is what is bad about death, then symmetry suggests that we do
have a reason to regret our prenatal existence (Brink, 2011). In
defense of the second symmetry argument, Brink (2011) invokes
a metaphysical thesis about the essentiality of origin:   “for  
something to harm me it must make me worse off than I would
otherwise have been, although this does not establish the
essentiality   of   time   of   birth”   (p.   375-376). However, the
argument stipulates that even if one assumed  that  one’s  time  of  
birth was essential to one, it still would not follow that one could
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not   sensibly   regret   one’s   prenatal   nonexistence.   Lastly,   being   a  
coherent and legitimate object of regret does not make it
appropriate for one to be preoccupied with the possibility of
one’s   prenatal   nonexistence,   any   more   than   it   follows   from   the  
fact   that   one’s   death   is   a   legitimate   object   of   regret   that   one  
should be preoccupied with. While Epicureans most likely would
not welcome the reasoning surrounding the second symmetry
argument, the argument takes seriously and defends their appeal
to temporal neutrality (Brink 2011).
Minimizing Future Suffering
Discussions and attitudes about pain, grief, and
suffering are commonly favored within past temporal settings,
unlike those of happiness, comfort, and wellbeing that permeate
conversations with future temporal locales. This seems to be true
even in cases where this choice includes more total pain
(Callender,   2011).   Brink   (2011)   explains   Parfit’s   “painful
operation”  scenario  that  addresses  a  “more  total  pain”  instance  as  
irrationally biased and temporally relative:
There   is   a   painful   operation   that   requires   patient’s  
cooperation, and must be performed without the use of
anesthetic. But doctors can and do induce (selective)
amnesia after the operation to block memories of these
painful experiences, which are themselves painful. One
knows that one is scheduled for this procedure. One
wakes up in the hospital bed and asks the nurse whether
one have had the procedure yet. One knows that he or
she is one of two patients, but does not know which.
Either one is patient A, who had the longest operation on
record yesterday, or one is patient B, who is due for a
significantly shorter procedure. While one waits for the
nurse to check the records, one finds having a strong
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preference and hope that one is patient A, even though
A’s   pain   and   suffering   was   greater   than   B’s   will   be   (p.  
377).
Brink   (2011)   argues   that   patient   A’s   reasoning   might   not   be  
entirely rational; if both procedures are viewed prospectively and
retrospectively, there is a temporally neutral preference to
minimize suffering; it is only when greater suffering is in the
past and the smaller suffering is in the future that one displays
temporally biased preference for greater past pain. However, the
preference for either procedure appears unstable at best.
In support of this reasoning, Brink (2011) recalls
Socrates’  discussions  about  the  weakness  of  will  (akrasia)  in  the  
Protagoras; Socrates suggests that our judgments about what is
best are inappropriately influenced by the proximity of harms
and benefits, which leads to inflated estimates of their
magnitude. It is in these instances that temporal bias is
exemplified, leading to the agent’s  irrational  decisions.  The  fact  
that a brief hot judgment (defined by the immediate proximity of
indulgences) is preceded and followed by the prospective and
retrospective cool judgment (defined   by   agent’s   decision   to  
forsake short-term indulgences for the sake of later long-term
ones), is the evidence that the hot judgment cannot be trusted.
Socrates classifies this instance as irrational, as opposed to
akratic. The bias in favor of minimizing future suffering appears
anomalous against the background of prospective and
retrospective cool judgments that are temporally neutral (Brink
2011).
The irrationality of temporal bias is further exemplified
through the lack of generalization. As much as past pain is
preferred over future pain, even in the case of more total pain,
this is often untrue of disgraces (Brink, 2011). One is likely to
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prefer smaller future disgraces to larger past ones, thus indicating
non-generalizability of the preference, as in the medical
procedure example. Further, the preference seems to hold only
for   one’s   own   pains,   while   the   pain   of   others   seems   to   be  
temporally neutral (Parfit, 1984). In conclusion, Brink (2011)
argues that, from the evolutionary perspective, a forward-looking
bias that prioritizes the minimization of future pain, as it relates
to   one’s   fitness   in   a   way   that   past   pain   could   not,   might   help  
explain why one might be subject to this bias even when it is not
rational. However, any divulged bias has inherent
generalizability and instability issues, making arguments about
temporal neutrality relevant and indelible.
Conclusion
David   O.   Brink’s   Prospects for Temporal Neutrality
was written as an introductory chapter to The Oxford Handbook
of   Philosophy   of   Time’s Time, Ethics and Experience section,
and is 1 of the 23 chapters that comprehensively cover topics in
the philosophy of time.
The chapter examined issues surrounding intertemporal
distribution  of  benefits  and  harms  within  a  single  life.  Prudence’s  
demand of temporal neutrality as a norm of intrapersonal
distribution was the main focus of the chapter. Brink (2011)
argued  that  prudence’s  demand  of  temporal  neutrality  assigns  no  
normative significance per se to the temporal locations of
benefits   and   harms   within   a   person’s   life, and demands equal
concern for all parts of that life. The primary rationale of
temporal neutrality appears to be the principle of compensation;
it provides a hybrid structure of prudence by being temporally
neutral and agent-biased, and by appealing to assumptions about
the separateness of persons. However, controversial aspects of
temporal neutrality still remain, especially within cases of
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interpersonal conflicts of values and ideals. The Epicurean
arguments about the symmetry between death and prenatal
nonexistence also appeared relatively defensible. Finally,
temporal  neutrality’s  rejection  of  preferences  for  past  over  future  
pain, even when this entails preferences of more total pain,
appear unstable and non-generalizable due to bias (Brink 2011).
Brinks’  concluding  suggestion  calls  for  a  systematic  comparative  
assessment of temporal neutrality, acknowledging that as it
stands, its prospects remain sound.
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